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Abstract—This paper presents an agent-based computational
economics model (ACE) to study demand-pull and cost-push
inflation. Moreover, it studies the effect of different levels of
rationality on the equilibrium price and unemployment rate.
The model examines three different economies. In the first
economy workers choose firms randomly, in the second economy
there is loyalty between workers and firms. In the last scenario
workers are persistence to find jobs. Simulations show that
there is a positive relationship between equilibrium price and
level of rationality while there is a negative relationship with
unemployment rate. Moreover, the model is able to reproduce
the behaviour of demand-pull inflation and cost-push inflation
without homogeneous and perfectly rational agents assump-
tions.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the real economic world, the dynamic behaviour andinteractions between economic agents (for example, firms,
consumers and banks) are very complicated. Economic
agents are heterogeneous (i.e., different), autonomous (that is,
they have no central authority that controls them), and behave
irrationally. Moreover, the growing use of communication
technologies affect the market mechanism itself, increasing
the dynamic fluctuations of economic systems. Therefore,
economic systems are becoming more complex in terms
of their interdependencies. As such, economic theory and
traditional econometric tools are no longer as applicable as
they once were.
Economic theory assumes that agents are perfectly ratio-
nal, they have full knowledge about the market mechanisms,
prices, quantities supplied and demanded, current and future
inflation rates, the behaviour of other agents and their expec-
tations. In addition, agents have the computational abilities
to determine all different scenarios that may occur and have
the abilities to calculate the probability of each scenario
occurring. The agents select the best scenario and expect
that all other agents will select the planned scenarios. This
assumption is unrealistic because firstly, agents do not have
all knowledge about the economy and secondly, they do not
have the computational power to make optimal decisions [7],
[15], [17].
On the other hand, economic theory assumes that agents
are homogeneous, that is, they behave in a similar way
and have the same information about the economy. In fact,
agents are heterogeneous; each agent has its own preferences,
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knowledge, utilities and so on. Finally, economic theory
assumes that agents are anonymous, that is, there is an
auctioneer, union or invisible hand (Adam Smith) that deter-
mines the market price and then all agents, consumers and
producers, must follow that price. Economic theory depends
on these assumptions in order to study inflation.
An Agent-based Computational Economics models (ACE)
assume that agents are heterogeneous, boundedly rational [1],
[16], [18] and interact with each other. Each agent interacts
and communicates with other agents in its neighbourhood.
Also, agents follow simple rules in their interactions and
communications. Therefore, ACE is a bottom-up study of
economic phenomena, starting from the individual level.
Macro-properties or macro-level regularities emerge from
these interactions.
Economic theory ignores the communication and direct
interaction among agents. ACE modelling provides the mod-
ellers with facilities to model social behaviours which is not
an easy task when economic theories are used. Furthermore,
ACE modelling gives modellers the ability to engage and
model social communication skills.
This paper studies demand-pull and cost-push inflation by
using the ACE modelling technique. The paper investigates
the effect of different levels of rationality on the inflation
and unemployment rate. Moreover, the model relaxes the
homogeneity and anonymity assumptions, which are the key
assumptions in economic theory when studying inflation.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
characteristics and benefits of an agent-based computational
economics model and explains assumptions underlying this
approach. Section 3 describes in brief inflation and the main
causes of it. Moreover, it explains demand-pull and cost-push
inflation. In Section 4, bounded rationality is investigated.
The ACE model is described in Section 5 while results of
the simulations are explained in Section 6.
II. AGENT-BASED COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS
MODEL (ACE)
ACE refers to a set of computational methods which
simulate how autonomous agents, interact, communicate,
learn, evolve, and make complex decisions. Agents interact
locally with each other and with their environment; these
local interactions give rise to global regularities [7], [18].
The challenge is to explain how these global regularities
arise from local interactions of autonomous agents, and to
determine the rules that exhibit certain behaviour of the
problem under consideration.
This approach is in wide-spread use to study problems in
economics [16]. ACE is the computational study of economic
applications modelled as evolving systems of autonomous,
heterogeneous, bounded rationality interacting agents [16],
[17], [18], [19]. Tesfatsion [17] defined ACE as : the com-
putational study of economies modelled as evolving systems
of autonomous interacting agents. Starting from initial condi-
tions, specified by the modeller, the computational economy
evolves over time as its constituent agents repeatedly interact
with each other and learn from these interactions.
The ACE models have many differences from traditional
models [2], [6], [15], [18]. One of the key differences is that
ACE models allow us to model complex sets of relation-
ships that can not be explicitly modelled using traditional
modelling approaches, such as differential equations, due to
issues of data availability and degrees of freedom.
ACE modelling contrasts with traditional modelling. In
particular, modelling interactions between agents are easier
in ACE modelling than in traditional modelling.
This paper uses an ACE model to study inflation. There are
several reasons for this choice. Firstly, traditional economet-
ric modelling approaches generally assume that an economic
system is initially in some sort of equilibrium state. These
approaches analyse how changes in certain variables will
move the system toward a new equilibrium state. Sometimes,
however, the changes are derived without quantifying the
equilibrium state. In contrast, ACE allows us to quantify all
variables so that the modeller can compare each variable
before and after an action and explore the path of each
variable to its new equilibrium.
Secondly, the ACE model assumes that agents have dif-
ferent data and rules so they behave in different ways, even
when they are in the same situation. Economic systems are
one type of system that are characterized by the fact that their
aggregate regularities can not be inferred simply by looking
at how each individual agent behaves; the interactions play a
crucial role. This kind of system is characterized by the so-
called self-organization property. Traditional modelling does
not provide much guidance on the studying of this type of
system. By contrast, ACE allows us to study large systems
of such interacting economic agents from the bottom-up [6],
[7], [16], [17], [18], [19].
III. INFLATION
Inflation refers to a rise in the general level of prices of
goods and services over time, and reducing the value of
money [14]. This reduces purchasing power, it is falling.
Inflation occurs when the price level rises from one period to
the next. The widespread view in economics is that inflation
is caused by the interaction of a set of factors which are the
supply of money, output, unemployment and interest rate. In
this paper we will examine two theories that aim to explain
inflation.
A. Demand-Pull Inflation
Inflation that comes from an initial increase in aggre-
gate demand is called demand-pull inflation. Demand-pull
inflation occurs when the level of aggregate demand grows
faster than the underlying level of supply. Inflation may arise
because of an increase in exports, an increase in government
expending on goods and services or an increase in the supply
of money [14].
B. Cost-Push Inflation
Inflation in which price rises result from increased pro-
duction costs or similar factors, rather than from customer
demand, is called cost-push inflation. Rapid wage increases
or rising raw material prices are common causes of this
type of inflation. A situation that has been often cited as an
example of cost-push inflation was the sharp rise in the price
of imported oil during the 1970s, where some economists see
as a major cause of the inflation experienced in the world
[14].
More debates about the major reason for cost-push in-
flation: monetarist economists such as Milton Friedman [9]
argue against the concept of cost-push inflation because
increases in the cost of goods and services do not lead
to inflation without the government and its central bank
cooperating in increasing the money supply. The argument
is that if the money supply is constant, increases in the cost
of a good or a service will decrease the money available for
other goods and services, and therefore the price of some
those goods will fall and offset the rise in price of those
goods whose prices have increased.
IV. BOUNDED RATIONALITY
This section discusses one of the main concepts that is
related to ACE, namely bounded rationality. Bounded ratio-
nality is often a more realistic assumption than the perfect
rationality which is a common assumption in economic
theory. Zandt [20] defined bounded rationality as the bounded
rationality of agents means that there are limits on their
ability to communicate- formulate and send messages and
read and interpret messages- and calculate with information
in the brain. In other words, bounded rationality means that
agents have limited information and knowledge about the
environment and other agent’s behaviour. Moreover, agents
have not enough computational ability to make optimal
decisions.
In traditional economics perfect rationality is a key as-
sumption. Agents interact and make decision under full capa-
bilities and full knowledge about the environment and other
agents behaviour, that help to make an optimal decision. For
example, Nash Equilibrium depends on agents having full
knowledge about the other agents’ strategies and decisions
[12].
Furthermore, the assumption of perfect rationality sup-
poses that the decision maker (agent) understands all the
consequences of his actions and is able to assign a probability
to each state of nature. In contrast, in the real world, it is
impossible for agents to be completely rational, because they
are unable to think about all events that are related to a
decision. For example, the ability of agents to think about
all different possible acts is limited.
The perfect rationality model is increasingly rejected by
both laboratory experiments and with economic data [2],
[5], [20] because the perfect rationality assumption leads to
unacceptable results. Furthermore, when researchers collect
data from surveys and censuses, their models are unable to
display these data.
Bounded rationality with respect to available information
covers a wide range of restrictions on the behaviour of the
agents. Firstly, agents do not have perfect information about
their environment but rather acquire information through
interaction with the environment. Furthermore, the environ-
ment may change over time due to agent actions or external
influences. Secondly, agents may not know all that they want
to know about the other agents in the environment. Thirdly,
agents may not be able to correctly observe the decisions
made by other agents.
Bounded rationality assumes that real decision makers
have limits on the amount of cognitive processing that
they can dedicate to a decision. More specifically, decision
makers often deal with: limited time, limited resources and
incomplete information [2], [5], [16], [18]. Replacing the
assumption of perfectly rational agents by that of bounded
rationality agents allows us to build more realistic models of
agents’ decision making processes. Multiple attempts have
been made to model bounded rationality. Researchers such
as Arthur [2], Manson [13] and Alkemade and Poutre´ [1],
[3] focused on bounded rationality as an alternative way of
thinking of perfect rationality
Arthur [4] argued that the type of rationality assumed
in economics is local and deductive rationality. In general
situations for economics, Arthur disputed that this assump-
tion should be broken down for two reasons. Firstly, our
rationality is bounded. Secondly, we can not fully under-
stand the economic problem. Manson [13] used evolutionary
programming to implement the theory of bounded rationality
while Alkemade and Poutre´ [1], [3] examined different types
of bounded rationality.
V. THE MODEL
For simplicity, the model has neither technological change
nor savings or innovation. The model consists of a large
number of heterogeneous and interacting agents (firms and
workers) that demand and supply labour, produce and con-
sume goods, selling and buying them. Each firm produces a
single homogeneous and perishable good. Time is discrete:
t=0,1,2,... . The model describes job vacancies, wage setting
and trading behaviour as well as matching and bargaining,
demand and price formation as endogenous processes. Fur-
thermore, the model tests three scenarios that worker agents
may follow in their job search process.
A. Firms
The model is populated with a finite number of risky (there
is a probability they will go bankrupt) firms, indexed by i.
Firms produce a homogeneous, perishable good whose price
is greater than zero. Labour is the sole input for production.
Workers are homogeneous as far as their skills are concerned.
Firms and workers make a contract for one time period.
Hence, workers must search for new jobs at each time step.
Firms follow the next formula to determine how many jobs





where vit is the number of job-openings , Ii(t−1) is the
income of firm i at time t-1 and wi(t−1) is the contractual
wage at time t-1. Firms use the following function to deter-
mine their output (production).
qit = αnit; (2)
where qit is the quantity of goods produced by firm i, nit is
the number of hired workers at time t, and α is constant, it
is the labour productivity.
The economy follows algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1: general events of the agent-based model
Experiment initialisation
- numW set of workers, numF set of Firms, n set number of time steps
- set initial wage, income, beta and price
for(k = 0; k < n; ++)
{
// opening job process
for(i = 0; i < numF ; ++)
{
v[i] = ceiling(firm i income/firm i wage); // computes vacancies
// fill the jobs queue by -2 for vacancies
for(j = 0; j < numW ; ++)
{











// empty firm queue
// Calculate the sum of the wages over the firms
for(j = 0; j < numW ; ++)
{
Generate random number from uniform distribution rn.
for(i = 0; i < numF ; ++)
{
Calculates relative probability of wage firm p;
if(rn <= p)
{
if(there is a vacancy place in the queue ) then





for(j = 0; j < numF ; ++)
{
Calculate average of Wage demanded
Set contractual wage according to the formula 3 w
// look in the queue and find workers
for(i = 0; i < numW ; ++)
{
if(the queue has a worker) then
{
if(job[i][j] == −2 && w >=reservation wage &&
the worker do not have a work)
{





//Calculate the number of hired workers and the number
// of unemployed workers
}
// production process
Calculate the production for each firm using formula 2
// Trading process
// Empty product sold
// Set Product for sale = production for each firm
for(j = 0; j < numW ; ++)
{
for(i = 0; i < numF ; ++)
{
Calculate product need by each worker.
Product need= worker wage/ price ;
// price is the same for all firms.
if(firm product for sale > product need) then
The worker j will buy his need from firm i
else
Buy some from firm i and other part from another firm.
}
}
// update firms and workers
Update firm wage, price
Update worker status, wage
// write results
write average price, average wage, unemployment rate
number of vacancies, vacancy rate, GDP, Total production
}
B. Workers
The model is populated with a finite number of worker
agents: each worker supplies one unit of labour per period. A
worker j enters the labour market with a desired (satisficing)
wage wSjt [8], [11], and starts to search for a new job.
The workers may follows one of three different job search
scenarios as stated below. If the worker finds a job he will
accept this job if he earns a wage greater than the reservation
wage1 otherwise the worker becomes unemployed.
A worker/consumer j enters the goods market with income
equals to his wage wjt plus any money remaining from
previous periods. The worker j should spend all his income.
If he/she is unable to do that then he/she saves money and
will spend it in the next time step. The worker j uses his/her
knowledge about the market to optimise his buying-decision.
For example, if the worker j has full knowledge about 5 firms,
then start to select a firm with the lowest price and it has still
some production available to sell qit. If the worker j finds
a firm with price pit, then he/she calculates the amount of
1The reservation wage is the lowest wage at which a worker would be
willing to accept a job, which, for simplicity, we assume to be constant over
time and the same for each worker.
goods qjt by dividing income by pit. Clearly, we have the
following cases:
1) qjt ≤ qit: then the worker achieves his maximum
utility.
2) qjt > qit: the worker needs to look at his knowledge
and find another firm to buy qjt − qit
3) If the worker j still has money but there is no available
goods for him, then he saves this money for the next
time step.
C. Job Search
Each firm establishes how many vacancies it has. Workers
start to search for new jobs. A worker accepts a new job
only if he earns wage more than reservation wage wr: for
simplicity the reservation wage is constant. Workers follow
one of three searching scenarios available to find new jobs.
In the first scenario, the worker selects one firm to visit. He
selects a firm with a probability distribution based on the
contractual wage, i.e., a firm that has high wage, there is a
high probability for more workers to visit it and vice versa.
In the second scenario, the worker also visits only one firm,
but there exists a kind of loyalty between workers and firms,
i.e., if the worker was worked at a firm i, in next time step,
he first visits firm i if there is an empty vacancy he queues
up and asks for his desired wage (satisficing wage ws, see
equation 5, that is, the wage that a worker is willing to earn).
If the firm has filled all its vacancies in their job search then
he selects another firm according to the first scenario.
In the last scenario, workers are more determined to find
jobs. So, each worker visits more than one firm and queues
up in many queues if a worker finds more vacancies are
still available. Then, the worker follows the first scenario
to choose a firm to visit. Workers follow first come first
served rule, i.e., if the worker sends many offers to work
and receives many requests then he accept only the first
request and ignore the others. The idea of proposing different
scenarios for selection is to test the effect of these scenarios
on the unemployment rate and inflation fluctuations.
D. Matching and Bargaining
After finishing search process and workers have queued
up, each firm looks at its queue and calculate the current
contractual wage wit according to the next formula [10]:




where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, is a parameter representing firms’ power in
wage bargaining. A higher β indicates a higher force on the
side of the firm in wage setting. If the β = 0 this means that
firms set the contractual wage is only the average of wages
demanded by workers in the queue, while if β = 1, firms
ignore workers’ desiderata when they set the contractual
wage. In this paper we set β = 0.5, mit is the number of
workers that have queued up for firm i at time t. The firm
hires workers that accept work at this wage. When Workers
do not accept jobs, or there are no more jobs available, they
remain unemployed for this time step. Workers and firms at
the end of time t update their satisficing wage.
We follow Fagiolo et al. [8] in assuming that the firms and
workers set their satisficing wages according to the following
formulas: A firm i sets its satisficing wage based on the
percentage rit of the number of hired workers to the number
of jobs positions it has opened.
wsit =
{
wsi(t−1)(1 + |γ|), if rit < pi;
wsi(t−1)(1− |γ|), if rit ≥ pi.
(4)
where pi is a desired ratio of filled to open jobs pi ∈ (0, 1],
and γ is a random variable distributed uniformly in 0 < γ <
1 . Workers follow the following formula:
wsjt =
{
max(wr, wsj(t−1)(1− |ζ|)), if j is unemployed;
wsj(t−1)(1 + |ζ|), if j is employed.
(5)
where wr is the reservation wage, ζ is a random variable
distributed uniformly in 0 < ζ < 1.
E. Different Level of Rationality
The ACE model examines the effect of the level of
rationality on both the equilibrium price and unemployment
rate. Worker agents are endowed with a certain level of
knowledge, for example, a worker may have knowledge
about only one firm, i.e., information about firm price and
quantity available to sell. Therefore, the worker buys based
on his knowledge. In another scenario, the worker has
knowledge about two firms. Then the worker uses these
pieces of knowledge to optimise his buying-decision.
Moreover, the workers have knowledge about 3, 4 ..., 20
firms, i.e., the model starts by providing each worker agent
with information about one firm. In another experiment, the
model gives the worker agent information about two firms
and so on. On other words, the model experiments with
different runs under different level of knowledge that are
given to the worker agents.
F. Exit and Entry
Suppose that firm i faces negative profits, moreover, its
income approaches zero. Then the model makes firm i exit
the market and replace it by a new one, i.e., each exiting
firm is replaced by a new firm which initialised with the
average features of those firms still in the market at time t.
This process allows to keep the number of firms constant at
each time.
VI. RESULTS
This section describes the main results of the ACE model.
Quantitative analysis is performed and the results displayed.
A simulation has a hundred experiments; each experiment
runs an economy for 1000 time steps. The results are taken
at time step 1000. In all simulations that follows, we set
the number of firms numF=20 and the number of workers
numW=100.
A. Demand-Pull Inflation
These experiments depict the demand-pull inflation.
Demand-pull inflation happens when, for example, money
supply increases, then the equilibrium price point will move
to a situation where price is higher than the price in the first
place, but the GDP will be the same. This transition happens
in two steps. The first step when money supply increases
then the demand curve moves to the right, this means the
price increases and GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increases.
The equilibrium exists when the economy works under full
employment (unemployment rate equals natural or target
rate). Therefore, when demand increases the economy works
above full employment as the result wage responses to this
pressure on employment and starts to increase. Consequently,
the production cost increases and supply curve moves to the
left until reaches to the point when the economy achieves
full employment.
Figure 1 depicts the changes in prices when money supply
increases. When firms have 300 money supply at the first
time step the price2 is 40. When money supply increases
then the price level increases to 51. We calculate the price
level as the average of selling prices and GDP before and
after money supply increases. There is stability in demand-
pull results, as noted from the standard deviation being small.
In addition, Table 1 shows how changes in money supply
change the price level and GDP. GDPs are nearly the same,
which means the economy works at full employment. GDP
is calculated as the sum of all production multiplied by their
prices at time t.
Workers may follow one of three job search scenarios. The
performance of the economy is affected by these scenarios;
all scenarios can produce the demand-pull behaviour while
they are different in unemployment rate. In other words,
the unemployment rate, in the first scenario, is higher than
the unemployment rate if the workers follow the second
scenario,and the unemployment rate, in the second scenario,
is higher than if workers select the third scenario. Therefore,
the performance of the economy is sensitive to the search
procedures that workers are followed to search for their
new jobs. Moreover, the effect of search scenarios changes
the price level because when the unemployment rate high
then the production is limited and price is high while the
unemployment rate is small then there are huge production
that will affect on the price level. Figure 1 depicts the
demand-pull inflation when workers select second and third
scenarios for search new jobs, respectively.
B. Cost-Push Inflation
This section depicts the cost-push inflation. Cost-push
inflation occurs when wages (production cost) increase. The
economy suffers from cost-push inflation if the money supply
increases, i.e., if government or central bank intervenes by
pushing the economy throughout increases money supply.
If central bank does not respond to wage increases, the
economy itself reduces the effect of wage fluctuations. Figure
2We calculate price as the average of all selling-prices.
Fig. 1. Price level when money supply increase for three search scenarios










THE EFFECT OF CHANGING MONEY SUPPLY ON PRICE LEVEL
Fig. 2. Wage increases without central bank
Fig. 3. Cost-Push when Wage increases - search scenarios 1,2 and 3
2 shows that the economy is able to self-organise, i.e., the
economy has its mechanisms to diminish the effect of wage
increase, while Figure 3 shows the economy when central
bank intervenes by increasing money supply.
C. Effect of The Level of Rationality
This section describes the effect of amount of knowl-
edge/information that agents have on the equilibrium price
and unemployment rate. Knowledge is the only key factor
in our model that determines the level of rationality. The
model assumes that agents have the computational power to
optimise their buying-decision that is, choosing the firm that
has the best price and still has production to sell.
The model starts from different level of knowledge which
is available to each consumer/worker. Then, a consumer
enters the market based on his knowledge and calculates the
amount of production that he needs.
The main findings are that the inflation and unemployment
rate are effected by the level of rationality/knowledge that
the agents posses. Figure 4 and Figure 5 divide the level of
rationality — X-axis — into three parts. In the first part,
when the level of rationality, i.e., the amount of information
that the consumers have about the market, are small, we find
that there is a direct, weak relationship between the inflation
(the equilibrium price) and the level of rationality, that is,
the equilibrium price increases slowly when the information
level increase.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that there is positive relation-
ship between equilibrium price and the level of rationality
as well as the inverse relationship between unemployment
rate and rationality. At a low level of rationality, workers
neither have enough information about the job vacancies
nor wages. Therefore, they are unable to optimize their job-
search procedures. A significant percent of workers are still
unemployed, which will effect the demand side of the goods
market, that is push the demand curve to the left, i.e., the
price level and production decrease.
Figure 5 shows that when the level of rationality increases,
the unemployment rate decreases sharply in all scenarios. As
a result this means that as the number of employed workers
increases, follows that the demand side of the goods market
increases resulting in the demand curve moving to the right.
As a result the price level and production increase.
In the second part, when there is a moderate information
available for the consumer. We find that unemployment rate
and equilibrium price follow the same behaviour as first part
when the level of rationality increase. The only difference
is that unemployment rate in the second scenario starts to
reach to the steady state while in the other scenarios is still
decreasing.
In the last part, when consumers are nearly to be fully
rational or fully rational, unemployment rate reach to the full
employment which is the steady state of the economy. We
notice that each scenario or economy has its own steady state
which is based on its settings. We find that the third scenario
reaches low levels of unemployment which are between 2%
and 3% which equivalent to the unemployment rate in USA,
Europe and Japan, while other scenarios have high level of
unemployment rate.
In addition, when unemployment rate is small, then the
demand side of the goods market increase which move the
demand curve to the right, that is, the price level increase, but
the production level does not because the economy reaches
full employment. Then firms try to hire more workers by
increasing wages. On the other side the economy works
under full employment. Wage increases push the demand
curve to the right, but the economy is unable to increase the
supply side then price level increase. All scenarios behave in
the same manner in the last part.
Finally, real economic agents are not perfectly rational.
For example, economists have limited knowledge on what
exactly the natural rate of unemployment is. Moreover,
economists specify natural unemployment rate which is an
ambiguous variable. Therefore, it will be more accurate if the
economists can link between the level of rationality that the
economic agents have and what will happen in the economy
if some knowledge and/or computational power is hidden or
improved.
Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the level of ratio-
nality and the equilibrium price level for job-search scenarios
2 and three. Figure 5 shows that scenario 2 and scenario 3
have the behaviour due to the large scale for scenario 1.
Figure 6 shows that both scenarios have positive relationship
between the level of rationality and the equilibrium price
level, but their behaviour are quite different, for instance, at
low level of rationality, the change of the level of rationality
does not effect too much in the equilibrium price in scenario
3 while it has more of an effect in scenario 2. At high level
of rationality, both scenarios have the behaviour, that is, the
change in the level of rationality increases the equilibrium
price.
We performed the correlation and regression statistical
analysis for the relationships between the level of rationality
and unemployment rate and the equilibrium price. We found
Fig. 4. The effect of different levels of rationality on Unemployment Rate
Fig. 5. The effect of different levels of rationality on the equilibrium price
Fig. 6. The effect of different levels of rationality on the equilibrium price
-Scenarios 2 and 3





STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR THREE SCENARIOS
that there is a significant negative relationship between the
level of rationality and unemployment rate with correlation
coefficient -0.72, -0.92 and -0.95 for scenarios 1, 2 and
3 respectively. Table 2 shows the statistical results for the
three scenarios. Table 2 shows that there is a significant
relationship between the level of rationality and the equi-
librium price in all scenarios. Moreover, we performed a
regression analysis. we found that the level of rationality
effects negatively on unemployment rate, while it effects
positively on the equilibrium price level.
The ACE model is able to produce the demand-pull and
cost-push inflation without the key assumptions, homoge-
neous, anonymous and perfectly rational agents, of economic
theory. Furthermore, the model shows that the cost-push
inflation happens if the money supply is changed by the
government. On the other hand, increasing wages do not
produce inflation without the government intervening. This
result agrees with the monetarist theory by Milton Friedman.
The ACE model allows us to study the effect of different
level of rationality on both unemployment rate and the
equilibrium price. The model shows that there is negative
relationship between the level of rationality and unemploy-
ment rate. While there is a positive relationship between the
level of rationality and the equilibrium price. An economy
may achieve to a certain unemployment rate and certain a
equilibrium price, but the resources in the economy may able
to push the model to another equilibrium level better than the
old position. The economy can not able to move because the
level of information is below the level that motivates the
economic agents to interact with each to push the economy
to better situation.
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